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RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE        
INFLUENCE OF THE CROATIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE 
SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE 21st CENTURY  
By Stefan Ubiparipović 
Stefan Ubiparipović is a student in the Interdisciplinary Master’s Program in South-Eastern 
European Studies in the School of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade, Serbia. 
Introduction 
Religion has played an important, but more supportive than decisive role in the creation 
of the modern societies in South-Eastern Europe. At the end of the twentieth century, brutal civil 
war in Yugoslavia was labelled as having varying religious influences which shaped national 
identities and policies. Moreover, contrary to creating peace and coexistence between people, 
beliefs and faith in clerical organizations and their representatives were misused and lost in the 
vortex of warmongering, intolerance, and conflict. 
This essay will not go into details or analyse the influence of religious dogma which led 
to the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia and supported nationalistic policies of the 1990s. Instead, it will 
try to point whether these “pious” organizations still have considerable impact on current secular 
democracies. Furthermore, there is a need to specify that influence shown through tangible and 
vivid political decisions coming from the highest authorities and their behavior in regional and 
international relations. The focus will be on the two dominant Christian churches, namely the 
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Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church in Croatia and it will emphasize on their 
present relations with the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Croatia.  
Firstly, for each case separately, I will underscore the important legal relations between 
the state and church, pointing out their rights, privileges and obligations stemming from them. 
Secondly, recent events indicating war-like discourses supported indirectly or directly by the 
churches and with political consequences, are very important to be mentioned as an integral part 
of the explanation of the persisting poor quality of the contemporary Balkan relations. Thirdly, I 
will try to conclude with identifying similarities, together with relevant differences in these two 
cases, which are both being neglected and easily understood as if the internal situation has not 
changed since the Balkan wars.  
 
Fruitful Church-State Relations 
When writing about the Catholic Church among Croats (hereafter CCC) and Serbian 
Orthodox Church (hereafter SOC), it is important to point out several inexorable distinctive 
characteristics: their structural setup, hierarchy and the level of the official relations and 
secondly, the benefits and advantages when cooperating with the state.  
Firstly, structural architecture in both SOC and CCC is based on the strict respect of 
hierarchy and obeying Robert Michels’ "iron law of oligarchy.”1 What is extensive in this 
parallel is that the Croatian Church’s "supervisor" is a head of state and represents a 
personification of a different country (Vatican) and who is a state organ de jure. On the other 
side, the Serbian Patriarch enthroned in Belgrade can inadequately be compared to the Pope in 
view of controlling SOC branches in Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Macedonia. 
                                                 
1
 Robert Michels , Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy” 
(Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), p. 224. Available at:  
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/michels/polipart.pdf;  
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Position of the CCC is buttressed on several levels, with high importance of contracts regulating 
its work in Croatia and with logistical and political support from Vatican’s diplomatic missions 
accredited in the country. Pope Francis continues to back Croatia in international relations, as did 
Benedict XVI and John Paul II, having more internal and external weight and more advocating 
power. Notwithstanding, incumbent Patriarch Irinej may produce palpable outcomes after his 
meetings and joint statements with Serbian government officials, but has limited capacities to 
cope with external issues even during occasional limited tours and visits to the Serbian Orthodox 
diaspora. This may lead to the conclusion that the centralized SOC has an advantage. But 
without a strong international and morally legitimized support this is not the case. The Serbian 
Orthodox Church quickly updates its agenda in accordance with its contemporary challenges, but 
the voice of its ideas is not amplified nearly as much as in Croatia.
2
  
Secondly, in order to better determine the church-state cooperation, we need to underline 
their benefits and obligations. Prudent Apostolic Nuncio in Croatia, Giulio Einaudi, signed four 
treaties between 1996-1998, with the highest ranking Tuđman government members and with the 
help of the negotiating team headed by the then bishop of Krk, Josip Bozanić. These concessions 
offer stability and diminish the possibility of erratic political developments which would end 
badly for the church. Regardless, the first agreement revealed that the CCC “gained a high 
degree of autonomy and was widely protected” and is an independent legal entity. Furthermore, 
it has immunity for its clergy where “any judge had to inform the respective ecclesiastical 
authorities before starting an investigation against a clergyman.”3 Moreover, it states that the 
                                                 
2
 As a result, Jovan Zizulas, Eastern Orthodox metropolitan of Pergamon and the Chairman of the Academy of 
Athens, points out that Roman Catholics "have difficulties in identifying the Church because it exists as pendant to 
the state structures […]Vatican is appearing as a state in relations to other states". His quote is translated from the 
official website of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Original text in Serbian is available at: http://www.spc.rs/sr/crkva  
3
 Thomas Bremer, "Croatian Catholic Church and its Role in Politics and Society" Occasional Papers on Religion in 
Eastern Europe: Vol. 30, No.3 (2010): 8; Available at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol30/iss3/1.   
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“state accepted a marriage performed in church as valid for the state records [...] and access to 
prisons and hospitals for pastoral purposes.”4 The second treaty states that the Vatican can 
change the structure of dioceses, and Catholic education is recognized within the edifice of the 
Croatian system by the state. This means that the church is present at all academic levels with 
guarantees that the state bears the costs of religious education. The third treaty regulated 
formation of army and police priests and a special army ordinariate and a diocese. The final, 
fourth one, stipulates financial regulations by donating to each parish two average salaries per 
month,
5
 paying teachers in schools, universities, and kindergartens and taking over costs of 
reconstruction of church property damaged or destroyed during armed conflicts.  
The Serbian Patriarchate (Patrijaršija), the seat of the Patriarch, controls and sets up 
administrative units, chooses bishops and priests, and taxes its own churches on a yearly basis. 
Officially, SOC’s status is recognized as one of seven religious organizations by the Law on 
Churches and Religious Communities adopted in 2006, including legislation concerning 
Orthodox classes in elementary and high schools and church property restitution. A parallel 
could be drawn from the fact that both churches made their preferential statuses in a period of 
several years during a wave of government support. What is reverberated constantly in the public 
criticism against the SOC is its exemption from paying taxes and permissibility to establish and 
buy properties and make profits.
6
 Each bishop of a diocese is a manager, taxed by the 
Patriarchate, after which he can invest funds into reasonable or profitable policies. It is 
impossible to determine the quantity of money circulating, but some estimates show that SOC 
earns over €140 million per year, which would make it the biggest profitable enterprise after Oil 
                                                 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 “Established parishes were taken into account only if they have more than 3,000 members in cities or 1,000 in 
villages”. Ibid.  
6
 All religious organizations are exempt from paying taxes similarly as non-profit organizations.  
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Industry of Serbia and Telekom Serbia.
7
 The Serbian state budget pays for social, health, and 
pension securities for priests, monks, bishops, and other qualified employees of (all) religious 
communities which bulk up to €8, 5 million annually.8  Notwithstanding, the situation in Croatia 
is interesting when it comes to state subventions to the CCC, where every citizen pays a portion 
of his or her taxes to the church. The annual amount is almost ten times higher; the budget report 
from 2003-2013 showed that total of around €80 million (6 billion Croatian Kuna), was given to 
the Catholic Church.
9
 In addition, Zagreb pays for the property which was not returned to the 
church, and which is unadulterated and emblematically valuable. Restitution of Church property 
in Serbia was reported by the European Commission, in its 2006 Progress Report, as one of the 
signs showing limited and perhaps a partial rule of law where: “the Law on restitution of Church 
property was adopted [...] the legislation concerning restitution of other properties is still 
[negatively] outstanding.”10 
 
Political Engagement and Influence of the Church on the Society 
South-Eastern European countries suffer from a detrimental etatism of discourses, where 
the state basically owns and creates wide array of public opinions. Political elites directly impact 
on culture and serve as a linchpin in the amalgam with religious organizations which also 
influence the society. By creating strong relations and interdependence with the state, the 
intertwinement of the church and state bodies reflects the national identity and culture.  
                                                 
7
 Due to the lack of official data and only expert estimates and information from unnamed sources, this number is 
reported with great reservations. Look at: N1 (2015), “Crkva godišnje zaradi 140 miliona evra“, Belgrade; See: 
http://rs.n1info.com/a57268/Vesti/Crkva-godisnje-zaradi-140-miliona-evra.html 
8
 B92, “Crkva: Iz budžeta 8,5 mil. evra, u budžet nula“, Belgrade (2016); See: 
http://www.b92.net/video/vesti.php?yyyy=2015&mm=11&dd=03&nav_id=1058893  
9
 Information is based on the Croatian state budget reports. See: Ministarstvo finansija, “A. Račun prihoda i rashoda 
za 2013. godinu“, Republika Hrvatska, Zagreb and Ministarstvo finansija (2013), “B. Račun financiranja za 2013. 
godinu“, Republika Hrvatska, Zagreb; Available at: http://www.mfin.hr/hr/drzavni-proracun-2013-godina; 
10
 European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document: Serbia 2006 Progress Report”, Brussels; 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/sr_sec_1389_en.pdf   
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Even though political activism and advocacy is not their purpose, churches speak for the 
civil society and show they are an important stake holder.
11
 If we look closely to the population 
censuses from 2011, it is noticeable that in Serbia, 83.3 percent of the population are declared as 
ethnic Serbs and a bit more as Orthodox Christians with 84.6 percent.
12
 In Croatia, 90.4 percent 
declare themselves as ethnic Croatians but then religious self-determination drops to 83.9 percent 
Catholic.
13
 It is obvious that there is a connection with the religious affiliation and national 
identity, but that does not justify the unconstructive political approaches of the church or the 
inconsistent interreligious dialogue.     
Indeed, political involvement could be perceived as a voice of the underrepresented 
society or a self-interest motivation in order to secure the avoidance of repetition of a “basically 
hostile social settings for religion and church in general.”14 Orthodox church-state relations may 
have been fruitful, but it becomes vividly clear that Belgrade’s government practically owns the 
clergy decision-making hierarchy together with Patriarch Irinej.
15
 Even the pro-EU and pro-
NATO political decisions with which the church would never agree are passed, where only 
President Tomislav Nikolić strongly aligns with the conservative Patriarchate reactions. During 
                                                 
11
 “Being active both in time and space, [Church’s] mission cannot but have political implications.” Look at: 
Radovan Bigović, “The Orthodox Church in the 21st Century”(Belgrade: Foundation Konrad Adenauer, Christian 
Cultural Center,  2013), 29. See: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_36567-1522-2-30.pdf?140114143653;  
12
 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia,  “Religion, Mother Tongue and Ethnicity: Data by municipalities and 
cities”, 2011 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade; Available at: 
http://pod2.stat.gov.rs/ObjavljenePublikacije/Popis2011/Knjiga4_Veroispovest.pdf    
Državni zavod za statistiku, “Stanovništvo prema narodnosti-detaljna klasifikacia-popis 2011.“, Republika 
Hrvatska, Zagreb; See http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/censuses/census2011/results/htm/H01_01_05/H01_01_05.html; 
Državni zavod za statistiku (2011), “Stanovništvo prema narodnosti i vjeri, popis 2011.“, Republika Hrvatska, 
available at: http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/censuses/census2011/results/htm/H01_01_12/H01_01_12.html;                                                     
CCC built up the “reputation of being always against communism and [...] of being an organization which was 
undoubtedly Croat“. See: Thomas Bremer, op.cit., 1. 
14
Mirko Blagojevic, "Desecularization of Contemporary Serbian Society" Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern 
Europe: Vol. 28: No. 1 (2008): 40. See: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol28/iss1/4; 
15
 Close cooperation between PM Aleksandar Vučić and Patriarch Irinej raises criticism from more conservative 
clergy and laity. Look at Teleprompter (2015), “Sprega između režima i crkve: Patrijarh Irinej obukao mantiju 
režimskog politikanta“, Beograd; Available at: http://www.teleprompter.rs/sprega-izmedu-rezima-crkve-patrijarh-
irinej-obukao-mantliju-rezimskog-politikanta.html  
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the incumbency of President Boris Tadić, Serbian government has not dared to seriously 
approach Belgrade-Priština negotiations, frightened by church reactions which could incite wide 
social reaction.  
After the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS)
16
 won the majority of votes in 2012,
17
 it 
became clear that the church will not veto key decisions. In 2013, with the signing of the 
Brussels Agreement began the process of the “normalization of relations” between Belgrade and 
Priština and resulted in series of angry, relentless, denigrated, and unrealistic messages from 
SOC.
18
 For example, as a response to the event, bishop Amfilohije prayed at the central public 
square in Belgrade for Kosovo and Metohija and then served a commemoration for the death of 
the Serbian government and the National Assembly.
19
 Afterwards, the then Minister of Defence, 
Aleksandar Vučić20, for the first time in the history of the Patriarchate, participated in the 
meeting of the highest ranking episcopal body, the Holy Synod,
21
 and came out supported by the 
                                                 
16
 Serbian Progressive Party is a detached wing of the former highly nationalistic and conservative Serbian Radical 
Party. 
17
 It also won 48% of votes in 2014 Parliamentary elections where it historically had 63% of the seats in the National 
Assembly, and in the early elections in April 2016 it again won approximately more than 48%.  
18
 The pattern is already familiar as when “the militant faction of the clergy denounced Milošević after signing 
Dayton as a traitor”. See Ivan Iveković, “Nationalism and the Political Use and Abuse of Religion: The 
Politicization of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam in Yugoslav Successor States” Social Compass 49(4)(2002): 
525. 
19
 Bishop Amfilohije (not to be mistaken with Metropolitan Bishop Amfilohije Radović), went so far to compare 
PM Dačić with the assassinated PM Đinđić. He also was one of the loudest to fight against the Belgrade LGBT 
Pride walk through Belgrade. For more information look at: Aljazeera “Srbija: Varnice između Države i Crkve”; 
Available at: http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/srbija-varnice-izmedu-drzave-i-crkve (2013). 
20
 Aleksandar Vučić was one of the closest collaborators with Vojislav Šešelj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party 
who was accused of war crimes in the ICTY in The Hague. The Radical Party was nurturing strong relations with 
the SOC and Vučić continued to do so even after he split and founded a new party. Celebrating Orthodox holidays 
attracted a lot of votes, but recent years show that Vučić is not interested to show his religious tendencies to the 
public. A clear argument is the celebration of Slava by the SNS party without its leader in 2014. Slava is an 
Orthodox Christian celebration in honor of the patron saint, which is inscribed in 2014 on the UNESCO’s List of the 
Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. Look at Telegraf (2014), “Evo ko je sve došao na slavu SNS”; Available 
at: http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/politika/1283649-kako-je-slavio-sns-evo-ko-je-sve-bio-na-veselju-naprednjaka-foto  
21
 The importance of the Holy Synod is reflected in its previous endeavours, for example, its campaigns to boycott 
2004 Kosovo elections. For more information about the influence of this body since 1990 onwards see Angela Ilić,  
"Church and State Relations in Present-Day Serbia: Part II Legislation Regulating Church and State Relations" 
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 25, No.1, (2005). Available at: 
http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol25/iss1/2 and Radovan Bigović,  “The Orthodox Church in the 21st 
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church.
22
 Exercise of state control over religious dogma is not total, but it led to the de-labelling 
the government as being “traitor and quisling” and showing faith in desecularized Serbia.  
Pressure from the government and a weak abutment from the president made Patriarch 
Irinej rearrange its radical bishops replacing them with moderate ones. In particular, among 
defrocking bishops involved in scandals and radical statements such as Filaret, Jovan, and 
Kačavenda,23 bishop Artemije was additionally ostracized in 2015. Artemije was in charge of 
Kosovo and Metohija, and had an anti-government and anti-EU viewpoint and disagreed with 
Belgrade-Priština negotiations which led him to be, for the first time in the history of SOC, 
excommunicated. Currently, he leads a parallel organization, with catacomb churches and is 
heavily attacked by the Serbian Orthodox Church as a wild sectarian. Finally, after Kosovo 
negotiations continued in 2015, Patriarch Irinej reminded everybody of the danger of 
warmongering when he stated that Serbia will defend Kosovo “even with blood.”24 Positive sign 
of desecularization is that according to recent research, students “do not point out special 
                                                                                                                                                             
Century” (Belgrade: Foundation Konrad Adenauer, Christian Cultural Center, 2013), 27-87; Available at: 
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_36567-1522-2-30.pdf?140114143653 
22
 With his harsh rhetoric he persuaded the Church to step aside and let the Government do its job and promised to 
include the Patriarchate in the negotiations when there is real need for it (for example the property of the SOC in 
Kosovo). Večernje novosti (Belgrade, 2013), “Vučić razgovarao sa članovima Sabora SPC“,  Available in:  
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html:436598-Vucic-razgovarao-sa-clanovima-Sabora-
SPC  
23
 Filaret was famous for his pictures with kalashnikov rifle during the civil war in Yugoslavia and his blessings for 
some paramilitary organizations. Jovan was a bishop active in Canada and Kačavenda active in Republika Srpska.  
24
 The Patriarchate was also very active in 2015, campaigning against Kosovo joining UNESCO. An issue of 
Kosovo creating Kosovo Orthodox Church may lead to SOC losing its properties. B92 (2015), “Da li patrijarhu 
priliči da poziva “silu“ i “krv“; Available at: 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2015&mm=11&dd=25&nav_category=12&nav_id=1067331  
      Serbian government has a very careful approach when addressing the Kosovo issue where any realistic statement 
about Kosovo is a scandal. Vladimir Kostić, as a President of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 2015, 
stated that Kosovo is de facto and de jure an independent state, for which he was condemned by various politicians. 
The affair ended in a meeting hosted by the Serbian President Nikolić with special invitations to the academics, 
Patriarch Irinej, and where PM Vučić was asked to join. Look at: Balkan Insight, “Serbian Academy Boss in Hot 
Water Over Kosovo”; See: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-s-civil-society-backs-academy-director-
10-20-2015. 
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exclusivity of their nation comparing to other, which represents basis for economic, social and 
political development and progress.”25 
In Croatia, national feelings are coinciding with the current CCC policies and, contrary to 
Serbia, with the official statements of the highest government officials. It seems that modern 
Croatia still fears for its independence, despite being an EU member state, because anti-Serbian 
messages are used in order to keep the population united and to win political votes during 
campaigning. War-alike rhetoric provides help to certain civil society movements express their 
opinions, which are indirectly supported by religious dogma with an example of the unit named 
“Headquarters for the Defence of Croatian Vukovar [… which is] refusing two-alphabet Latin 
and Cyrillic signs in areas with minorities.”26 Seemingly interesting neighboring amity was at its 
apex in October 2015 when, due to a large inflow of migrants/refugees, Croatian government 
decided to close the borders unilaterally towards Serbia. Nationalistic public statements 
happened in both Serbia and Croatia where Croatian PM Zoran Milanović “reminded” Serbian 
Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić who is and who is not in the EU, even though Brussels 
practically ordered the borders to be open.  
The CCC continued to support the celebration of the operation “Storm” in 1995, which 
led to the forceful migration of 250,000 Serbs from Croatia, and avoids speaking negatively 
about fascistic Ustasha regime during the WWII. Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, criticizes 
the CCC and its nationalistic religious pillars which may contribute to the imploding of the 
edifice built above them.  After the SOC turned to its internal political issues “most forceful 
ethnic nationalism in the region has become Croatian nationalism with the Catholic Church as its 
                                                 
25
 Translated from Serbian from Iva Kalaba, "Čekajući regionalno pomirenje: studenti i nacionalizam u Srbiji" 
Zbirka radova (Post)sekularni obrt: Religijske moralne i društveno-političke vrednosti studenata u Srbiji,  (2013), p. 
278; Available at: http://www.kas.de/serbien/sr/publications/36583/;  
26
 Magda Ela (2015) "In Search of a Crisis in Croatia" Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 35. 
No. 2, p. 10; Available at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol35/iss2/3;  
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backbone and the church-state alliance as the key feature of its national identity,”27 it is 
interested in geopolitical and geoeconomical studies and asks questions whether the Croatian 
independent state is endangering anybody
28
. Far right bishops as Vlado Košić in Sisak, Ante Ivas 
in Šibenik and Mile Bogović in Gospić follow the path ignoring the Ustasha regime or even 
denying the existence of the concentration camp in Jasenovac, where thousands of Serbs, Jews, 
and Roma lost lives. Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac, active during WWII and beatified in 1998 by 
Pope John Paul II,
29
 is a problem on which Vatican tries to guide both CCC and SOC to a 
consensus. This is what Pope Francis intends to do, after accepting to receive the SOC delegation 
in January 2016 to an official meeting in Rome where they discussed the canonization of 
Stepinac. Some official church policies are practiced by civil servants and bureaucracy, as the 
refusal to organize sex-education in schools, advocating against same sex marriages and even 
persuading several doctors in state clinics to refuse giving abortions
30
.  
 
Conclusion 
Religious organizations in the Balkans, observed closely through the most dominant ones 
in Croatia and Serbia, have had more than a mild influence on the national identity and culture in 
the past. Their current strong position of economic independence is sustained through 
agreements and legislation regulating state-church relations. Both CCC and SOC gather more 
than 83 percent of the populations respectively, which declared themselves Catholic or Orthodox 
                                                 
27
 Vjekoslav Perica, "Power, Corruption and Dissent: Varieties of Contemporary Croatian Political Catholicism" 
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 35. No. 4, (2015), p. 4. Available at: 
http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol35/iss4/2  
28
 Many texts in the Croatian Churches’ newspaper Glas koncila are focused on international relations, see: 
http://www.glas-koncila.hr/index.php;  
29
 Pope John Paul II had beatified more people than all of his predecessors since the invention of this procedure in 
the 16
th
 century.  
30
 In February 2016, United Nations Human Rigths Committee affirmed, in a ladmark case concerning a 17 year old 
Peruvian woman, that abortion is a human right.  
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXXVI, NO.3 (MAY 2016) 34
Christian in the censuses held in 2011. Strong role of politics in the entire region is connected to 
the churches, which historically became dominant again after advocating for nationalistic 
policies in the post-communist era. 
Religion carries much clout and it is channelled through churches which are politically 
active and refuse to show propitiation and rejuvenation. In specific cases mentioned in this essay, 
churches are trying to preserve their status and act in their historic legacy and role. Nationalism 
in Serbia and Croatia switched roles, where the latter remained in the shape of radical and 
conservative clergy. Nobody is saying that the Orthodox Church does not have similar problems 
but there is a weaker role for it in uniting the population through religious dogma than remained 
is the case in Croatia. 
Spiritual mobilization is not as popular as before; churches are not influential on a large 
scale. In the Serbian case, the state shows concrete results in containing religiously inspired 
actions outside of reconciliation and regional politics. The Catholic Church in Croatia still rides 
with the use of the national card, supported by high ranking politicians and reiterating feelings 
from the Homeland War of the 1990s and historic legacies. 
I will finish with mentioning the “no interference of religious dogmas” indicator of the 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index.
31
 All ex-Yugoslav countries combined have an average mark
of 9/10 which shows encouragement that religious influences largely remain outside the 
institutional frameworks and that the respect for the democratic consolidation procedures is very 
active. Nevertheless, even though the methodology of the Index shows differently, there are a 
number of cases where decision-makers both in Serbia and Croatia have to seek the blessings 
from the churches and convince them of the correctness of their intended policies. This is not 
31
 The BTI measures the quality of democracy, political management and market economy in 128 developing 
countries, where the lowest value is 1 and the highest is 10. For more information look at Knoema website: 
http://knoema.com/GSBTI2014/bertelsmann-transformation-index-2014?tsId=1007480;  
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only depicted through the careful and under the radar solving of the Kosovo problem in Serbia or 
the protection and implementation of minority rights in Croatia, but also when considering 
changes in economic policies and other foreign relations. There is a need for a stronger system of 
checks and balances for the executive authorities in both countries but also for a mechanism 
which will avoid churches being a political representative of the civil society.   
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